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Regulating cross-media ownership:
A comparative study between Australia and
Italy
Larissa Di Mauro* and Grace Li†
Regulating media ownership is not a simple task. The media represents a
field where public interest collides with technological and economic
interests. The law is challenged to strike a balance between all three
dimensions. This article attempts to deconstruct cross media ownership
regulation amidst this field. It establishes the theoretical viewpoints that
influence the development of cross-media ownership laws, which puts
forward the relevant principles and viewpoints that support the
social/political, economic and technological dimensions. It then
demonstrates the interaction of these dimensions in practice by presenting
a comparative case study of cross-media ownership laws in Australia and
Italy. In doing so, this article finds that cross-media ownership regulation
requires the careful balancing of competing influences. Sound
understanding of competing spheres of influence that interact in the realm of
media ownership policy allows legislators to best formulate the directions of
Australian law.
Introduction
Ownership of the media matters. It matters because the media has long been
regarded as ‘the fourth estate’, a public institution responsible for informing
the public, facilitating public debate and keeping those in power accountable
for their actions.1 Questions of how to structure cross-media ownership
legislation is therefore never an easy task; acknowledgment must be made of
the complexity of competing interests, and the implications that cross media
ownership regulation can have for the wider public, corporate entities and
democratic society.
The controversy of cross-media ownership has been well debated
throughout the world. To date, much of the topical and empirical research has
centred on three predominant theoretical considerations; namely, economic,
information technology and public/political interest theories.2 State regulation
of cross-media ownership varies from country to country, however most states
* Graduated from law/journalism, University of Technology Sydney; currently employed as a
solicitor at Clayton Utz. Email <ldimauro@claytonutz.com>.
† Law lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Technology, Sydney. Email
<grace.li@uts.edu.au>.
1 J Schultz, ‘The Press’ in S Cunningham and G Turner (Eds), The Media and
Communications in Australia, Allen & Unwin, NSW, 2002.
2 There has been much literature focusing on these three theoretical considerations. See, eg,
International Institute of Communications, Media Ownership and Control in the Age of
Convergence, International Institute of Communications, London, 1996, p 282; G Doyle,
Understanding Media Economics, Sage, London, 2002; K C Creech, Electronic Media Law
and Regulation, 5th ed, Focal Press, 2007, pp 406–12; Schultz, above n 1; and J Keane, The
Media and Democracy, Blackwell Publishers, Cambridge,1991, pp 1–50.
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set their policies based on one or two of these three considerations, which has
ultimately resulted in the development of biased regulatory policies. When
such bias culminates in law, media ownership regulation can have a
detrimental effect on a broad range of stakeholders.3
Ideally, if policy makers could balance all three competing aspects,
cross-media ownership regulation could foster an innovative approach that is
neither too liberal, nor too strong, but strike a harmonious balance between
opportunism and protectionism.4
Against this background, this article aims to provide a literature review of
the three theoretical considerations outlined, as well as a comparative study of
cross-media ownership regulation between Australia and Italy. This article
departs from the premise that although Australia and Italy are both recognised
as having legislation conducive to concentrated media ownership, the policy
directions which have informed legislative development in the two countries
have been vastly different. Broadly speaking, this article finds that the parallel
between the situation in Italy and Australia is clear — Italy provides a
compelling example of political influences affecting media policy, while
Australian legislative directions appear to favour technological and economic
development. Further, this article surmises that neither jurisdiction presents an
ideal model for cross-media ownership regulation. By drawing on the
strengths and weaknesses of the approaches taken in each nation, it is clear
that there is room for improvement in both.
A literature review of the media ownership regulation
The Social/Political theory promotes media diversity as a predicate to
pluralism and democracy.5 Media ownership in Australia and internationally
has historically been recognised as a distinguished sector, worthy of specific
regulatory attention to safeguard the public’s interest in media diversity.6
Departing from the predicate that the press plays a fundamental role in
equipping the public with information upon which decisions affecting
democratic governance are made, there are typical arguments which underpin
freedom of speech. These arguments have one common foundation; pluralism
demands that individuals have open access to varied, unhindered viewpoints.
Many theorists, including Julliane Schultz7 and Jeremy Bentham,8 have put
forward arguments outlining the fundamental role of freedom of speech in
promoting democracy. In addition, an alternate basis upon which the ‘public
interest’ foundation of the media can be founded is that set out in theorist John
3 International Institute of Communications, above n 2, p 21; and D McQuail, ‘Media Policy
— Premature Obsequies?’ in H Tumber (Ed), Media Power, Professionals and Policies,
Routeledge, London, 2000, pp 20–4.
4 McQuail, above n 3.
5 Schultz, above n 1; Keane, above n 2.
6 G Doyle, ‘From “Pluralism” to “Ownership”: Europe’s emergent policy on media
concentrations navigates the doldrums’ [1997] 3 Jnl of Information, Law and Technology.
7 Schultz, above n 1.
8 D Kingsford-Smith and D Oliver, Economical With the Truth: The Law and Media in a
Democratic Society, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990, p 96.
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Stuart Mill’s On Liberty (1859).9 Ultimately, social and political influences on
legislative policies must be considered amidst a broader context. Academics
recognise that:
The conceptualization of the mass media as being either ‘the fourth estate’ or
‘agencies of social control’ is an oversimplification. The role of the mass media at
any time is shaped by factors particular to the period under consideration as well as
the medium under study.10
As the social and political dimension presents a long-standing influence on
regulatory policy, it is essential that it is given adequate authority and not
downplayed to advance other competing interests.
Economic considerations recognise that regulation must facilitate open
access to the media market, while ensuring that media corporations are able to
sustain efficient economic practices. Any analysis of influences on media
ownership must consider the correlation between the media industry and
conglomerate market structures.11 Gillian Doyle has focused much of her
research on analysing the relevance of economic impacts on media
ownership.12 She believes that ‘[e]conomics provides a theoretical framework
for analysing markets based on the clearly defined structures of perfect
competition, monopolistic competition, oligopoly and monopoly’.13 Media
ownership poses a predisposition towards monopolistic and oligopolistic
market structures.14 By analogy, Doyle has connected conglomerate market
structures to a lack of marketplace diversity15 and, building upon Doyle’s
argument, Robert Hassan recognises that economic markets can operate to
preclude competition.16 John Buckley further cements this view, noting that
unused economies of scale often result in monopolistic supply networks which
create ‘a frequent market entry barrier’.17
Proponents of economic interests and structures in the media industry often
argue that competition law is sufficient to regulate and maintain diversity in
the media industry. This argument is overtaken when the interaction between
fields is accounted for, and other fields influencing policy are considered. It is
clear that while economic interests are a major contributing field, if legislative
policy was based solely on economic considerations, then discussions about
9 J Stuart Mill, On Liberty, 1968, p 65.
10 J Eldridge, J Kitzinger and K Williams, The Mass Media and Power in Modern Britain,
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997, p 13.
11 Doyle, above n 2.
12 Ibid, p 19.
13 Ibid.
14 ‘A monopoly exists where a single supplier has levels of technology and production that
allow it to supply a whole or significant sector of the market. According to economic theory,
where one supplier can supply the whole market, then ‘at the current level of demand the
market will allow no more than one supplier to produce at the minimum point on the cost
curve’: J Buckley, Telecommunications Regulation, IET Books, 2003, p 11. This situation is
then classified as a natural monopoly, as gaining entrance to the market is particularly
difficult for small enterprises who do not have the capital and skills to take on a large,
already established organisation to compete for profits.
15 Doyle, above n 2, p 163.
16 R Hassan and J Thomas, The New Media Theory Reader, Open University Press, 2006,
p 101.
17 Buckley, above n 14, p 11.
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media diversity and probing into technological directions of the media would
be largely irrelevant.
The technological dimension argues that by deregulating the market, the
public’s interest in media diversity will be met as new digital technology
facilitates multi-channelling,18 and opens up the market to new media players
who have traditionally been unable to compete.19 This school of thought had
been accepted by many scholars.20 Proponents for technological development
believe that as the public are accessing media via new modes, laws limiting
ownership of traditional media sectors are no longer relevant. This argument
is supported by the growth of broadband internet access, and will be further
facilitated by the move to digital broadcasting, allowing for multi-channels
and innovative content delivery.21 The technological dimension has also
created a new influence upon media regulatory policies. This field is
constantly developing and changing and it is therefore interesting to note that
there are conflicting arguments even within this field of knowledge.22 This
field is likely to take a leading role in directing media ownership regulation
into the future. The challenge is for regulators to foster technological
development without hindering social/political and economic interests.
In practice, while each of these dimensions generates different aims for
cross-media ownership regulation, there are also many overlapping
objectives.23 This article argues that only by coming to a balance of all three
objectives will any one ever be truly satisfied. To demonstrate this argument,
the following provides a comparative study of the cross-media ownership
regulations betweenAustralia and Italy, and reveals that the regulation in these
two jurisdictions are founded on diverse theoretical dimensions, with
weaknesses and room for improvement in the approach of both nations.
Media ownership regulation in Australia
The Australian geographic landscape and population distribution are relevant
considerations in determining the possible impacts on changes in diverse
18 The meaning of multi-channelled broadcasting service has been given by cl 5A of Sch 4 of
the Broadcasting Services Act 1992.
19 International Telecommunications Union, Trends in Communication Reform 2006:
Regulating in the Broadband World, 2006, p 1.
20 G Doyle, Media Ownership, Sage, 2002, p 151. Also see S Lacy, A Broadrick Sohn,
G Sylvie and J LeBlanc Wicks, Media Management: A Casebook Approach, 2nd ed,
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc, Mahwah, NJ, 1999, p 384.
21 Commonwealth of Australia, ‘Ready, Get Set, Go Digital — A Digital Action Plan for
Australia’ (2006) Digital Action Plan, at <http://www.dcita.gov.au/_data/
assets/file/53556/Digital_Action_Plan_web.rtf>.
22 Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance, ‘Official Spin: Censorship and Control of the
Australian Press 2007’ (2007) MEAA 2007 Australian Press Freedom Report, p 15.
23 For example, while technological influences lend towards the deregulation of the media
market to take advantage of new opportunities, this is also aligned with economic interests.
By reducing limitations on cross-media ownership, media corporations are able to move into
new areas of the market, thereby satisfying ‘economies of scale’. Another example of
objectives overlapping is evident when social/political interests in media diversity are
aligned with the economic interests in promoting market competition. While the economic
sphere realises that competition should be encouraged in all economic markets, this also
works to satisfy the social/political value that is placed in media diversity as a requisite to
public access to a wide range of voices, and democracy.
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media markets. Due to the existence of lowly populated regional areas, any
increase in the concentration of media corporations and ‘control’ threatens to
have a negative impact on pluralism in areas where there is limited access to
communication and information mediums.24 This situation is prevalent in the
Australian context, and must be considered throughout legislative proposals.
Recent history
Media ownership regulation was put on the national agenda in 1985 following
a study of the ownership and control of commercial television.25
Consequently, the Broadcasting (Ownership and Control) Act 1987 (the 1987
Act) amended the Australian Broadcasting Act 1942, resulting in stricter
controls on cross-media ownership.26 This legislation was the first of its kind
in Australia. It was aimed at imposing clear cut restrictions on media
ownership, based on audience reach in order to limit any single owner from
having control over diverse media forms.27 Although the 1987 Act only
applied to television and newspapers, the scope of the Act was extended to
incorporate radio ownership through the Broadcasting (Ownership and
Control) Act 1988.28 The 1987 Act was further amended by the Broadcasting
Amendment Act (No 2) 1990, which exempted affiliated television licensees
and lending institutions from breaching the definition of control and audience
scope regulations. Subsequently, the Broadcasting Act 1992 overhauled
cross-media ownership regulation and has remained in operation until 2006,
when it was amended by the Broadcasting Services Amendment (Media
Ownership) Act. While the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 carried over many
existing cross-media ownership restrictions, there was one fundamental
difference: the Act altered the limits on cross-media ownership for a
newspaper proprietor from 5% of a television licence to 15% by virtue of the
definition of ‘control’,29 as set out in Sch 1 s 6.30 Section 60 required that there
24 Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance, above n 22, p 15.
25 ‘Ownership and Control of Commercial Television: Future policy directions’, August 1986.
Recommendations from this report instructed the policy directions of the Broadcasting
(Ownership and Control) Act 1987.
26 The parliamentary E-brief summarised the amendments stating:
The proposals involved the replacement of the existing ‘two station rule’ with an
audience reach rule, which limited any person to controlling interests in licences serving
a maximum of 75% of the population. In addition, cross-media restrictions were to be
imposed which were designed to prevent a person from controlling both a television
licence and a newspaper published 4 times per week and having more than 50 per cent
of its circulation in the same area served by the television licence.
J Gardiner-Garden and J Chowns, ‘Media Ownership Regulation in Australia’ (2006)
Parliament of Australia E-Brief, at <http://www.aph.gov.au/library/INTGUIDE/
SP/Media_Regulation.htm>, p 17.
27 Ibid.
28 ‘The owner of a radio licence could not own more than 15 per cent of a television licence
serving substantially the same market and 15 per cent of a newspaper published 4 days per
week and with more than 50 per cent of its circulation in the same area serviced by the radio
licence. Similarly, the owner of a television licence was restricted to owning 15 per cent of
a radio licence serving substantially the same market, while a newspaper proprietor could
own up to 15 per cent of a radio licence’: ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 The definition of control was set out in Sch 1 s 6 of the Broadcasting Services Act and
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was no common ownership of a television and radio, television and
newspaper, or radio and newspaper broadcasting licence in the same licence
area.31 The Broadcasting Services Act 1992 also contained ‘statutory control
rules’, placing caps on conglomerate media broadcasting ownership and
licences within certain sectors of the media market.32
Current status
Media ownership is currently regulated by two overlapping legislative
frameworks — the Broadcasting Services Amendment (Media Ownership)
Act 2006 (Media Ownership Act), which sets standards and restrictions on
media mergers and acquisitions, and competition law, as set out in the Trade
Practices Act 1974 (Cth).
The Media Ownership Act formed part of a broader media reform initiative
in 2006,33 and brought two significant changes. First, it allows media
enterprises to take control of a greater share of the market, subject to the
provision that there is a ‘minimum number of separately controlled
commercial media groups’ operating in the licence area. Second, the Act
facilitates the removal of restrictions and barriers on foreign ownership of the
media. By deregulating the market, the Act aims to promote technological
development and create a market that is positioned to take advantage of the
‘digital revolution’.34
The Broadcasting Legislation Amendment (Digital Television) Act 2006
incorporated regulations that require the advancement of stipulated
broadcasting procedures and technologies. In due course, this legislation will
facilitate a changeover from analog to digital television, as well as regulate
broadcasting licences. The move towards digital television creates
opportunities for increased media diversity and, accordingly, should be
considered as an influential technological development that affects directions
stipulated that where a person holds company interests that exceed 15%, without any proof
disputing the assumption, that person is held to have a controlling interest in the company.
There were several limitations upon the scope of this power including: the 15% rule is not
applicable where there is a 50% shareholder, as long as that shareholder is not affiliated to
another person with an interest in the company; a person may be deemed to be in control of
a company where they held a holding of less than 15% if there is no other person with a
similar share holding; this rule is extended to cover successions of company groups: see ibid.
31 Section 60 of the Broadcasting Services Act stipulates that a person must not control:
A commercial television broadcasting licence and a commercial radio broadcasting
licence have the same licence area; a commercial television broadcasting licence and a
newspaper associated with that licence area; or a commercial radio broadcasting licence
and newspaper associated with that licence area.
Commonwealth of Australia, ‘Broadcasting Services Amendment (Media Ownership) Bill
2006, and discussion paper by the Minister for Communications, ‘Information Technology
and the Arts on the two channels of spectrum for new digital services’, 2006, Parliament of
Australia Senate Report, at <http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/
ecita_ctte/cross_media/report/c02.htm>, para 2.6.
32 Gardiner-Garden and Chowns, above n 26, pp 6–10.
33 The 2006 amendments to the regulatory framework incorporate the Broadcasting Legislation
Amendment (Digital Television) Bill 2006; Television License Fees Amendment Bill 2006;
and the Communications Legislation Amendment (Enforcement Powers) Bill 2006
34 Commonwealth of Australia, above n 21.
200 (2009) 14 Media and Arts Law Review
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 87 SESS: 1 OUTPUT: Tue Jul 21 10:32:03 2009
/journals/journal/malr/vol14pt2/part_2
of media ownership regulation and the argument that ownership of the media
matters.
As part of media law reforms, the government allocates two licences for
channels that will provide digital services.35 Each channel comprises different
digital capabilities, incorporating data-casting, narrowcasting and mobile
television services. These channels are an important part of the move to
digital, as their allocation is subject to competition law and will open up
opportunities for new players to get on board.
Finally, the Communications Legislation Amendment (Enforcement
Powers) Act 2006 provides increased enforcement powers for the Australian
Communications and Media Authority (ACMA). The ACMA plays an
important role in ensuring that media players comply with regulatory
standards. This legislation places greater responsibility on the ACMA to
ensure that ‘media ownership and content are protected under changes to the
regulation of media ownership’.36
Having established the broad context of media reform legislation, it is
possible to focus on the likelihood of the amendments resulting in the
liberalisation of cross media ownership. The Media Ownership Act introduced
a 5/4 rule aimed at limiting convergence of media markets beyond an
acceptable level, while simultaneously opening up the market and increasing
competition.37 The 5/4 rule ‘provides for a minimum of five separate
traditional media “voices” in metropolitan radio licence areas and four in
regional licence areas’.38 In practice, the 5/4 rule is not dissimilar to its
predecessor (s 60 of the Broadcasting Services Act), to the extent that it
requires that broadcasting licences do not surpass an acceptable level of
diversity in ownership within a licensing area.
The regulatory powers of checks and enforcement do vary considerably.
The Media Ownership Act refers to the notion of an ‘unacceptable media
diversity situation’, which arises if a media merger or acquisition occurs
without satisfying the 5/4 rule.39 Under the new Act, the ACMA has been
given an increasingly prominent role in regulating the media landscape, by
determining whether ‘an unacceptable media diversity situation’ has resulted
from a media merger.40 Most notably, the effects of the 5/4 rule will be
explored. A table set out in the parliament of Australia’s ‘Media Ownership
Regulation in Australia’ E- Brief41 predicts that out of 86% of the radio market
population, which also has a daily newspaper covering the same area, the
introduction of the 5/4 rule will lead to a reduction in the minimum number
of possible owners.
The effects of the legislation in reducing media diversity are clearest when
35 ACMA, ‘Media Reform — Guidelines for narrowcasting television services fact sheet’,
2008, at <http://www.acma.gov.au/WEB/STANDARD/pc=PC_310119>.
36 Commonwealth of Australia, above n 31, para 1.27.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid, para 2.8.
39 Ibid, para 2.9.
40 ACCC, ‘ACCC and ACMA seeking to share confidential media merger information’, Press
Release, 2007, at <http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/781932/
fromItemId/2332>, para 6.
41 Gardiner-Garden and Chowns, above n 26, p 66.
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considered in the context of Australia’s two largest and most influential
licence areas — Sydney42 and Melbourne.43 In both of these licence areas, the
Media Ownership Act permits the eradication of six existing media owners.
Accordingly, the diversity of corporations with cross-media interests can be
more than halved for 36.88% of the Australian population.44
The way in which media diversity is defined greatly affects legislative
structure. Legislators and policy makers are faced with differing views on
what the aims of media diversity are and how such aims should be protected
through legislation. The Media Ownership Act has defined the scope of
‘diversity’ to include the promotion of access to diverse media services
(including radio, television, newspapers, data-casting45 and other services
offering ‘entertainment, education and information’ ),46 as well as ‘diversity in
control of the more control of the more influential broadcasting services’.47
It is important to note that the ACCC continues to hold an important role
under the Trade Practices Act. The ACCC operates within competition
framework to assess the competitive impacts of cross-media ownership
transactions.
Future directions and evaluations
Following the enactment of the Media Ownership Act, the future directions of
Australian media ownership policy remain to be seen.
Commenting on the opportunities brought about through the introduction of
the law, the former Communications Minister, Helen Coonan said:
Existing players can make the most of emerging digital media technologies and
make the most of flexibility to become globally competitive media companies . . .
I believe that Australia’s media sector is stronger, more consumer-driven and more
competitive than ever before and is now well-placed to take advantage of the digital
age.48
While this statement draws attention to the opportunity created under the 2006
law, it fails to recognise that the practical application of the law is yet to be
proven. Senator Coonan advocated that by furthering technological and
economic interests, media diversity and the social and political interests of the
public would ultimately be protected.49 With the media market in a state of
flux after the inception of the new law, the situation is still unclear.
Analysis of the media market shows clear evidence of takeovers and merger
activity. Even before the Media Ownership Act was promulgated, there was
42 The Sydney licence area accounts for an 18.97% share of the Australian population (ibid).
43 The Melbourne licence area accounts for a 17.91% share of the Australian population (ibid).
44 Ibid.
45 Media Ownership Act s 3(aa).
46 Ibid, s 3(a).
47 Ibid, s 3(c).
48 Senator Helen Coonan, ‘2007 — Reaping the benefits of the media reforms’, Paper
presented at the ABN AMRO Communications Conference, 2007, pp 107–10.
49 ‘Existing players can make the most of emerging digital media technologies and make the
most of flexibility to become globally competitive media companies. The package also
allows encourages new entrants into the media market. It places consumer’s front and centre
— new digital services give them the power to tailor their own media experience. This in
turn helps to protect diversity’: ibid.
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movement in the market as media corporations attempted to size up their
interests and ensure that they were well positioned to take advantage of
changes in the media market. The rationale and trigger for many of these
mergers and deals was the incentive of having fluid assets that would allow
corporations to best take advantage of the relaxation of Australian media
laws.50 In a $4 billion deal, Channel Seven sold a 50% share in its main media
assets (including Channel Seven, Pacific Magazines and Yahoo online) to
private equity firm Kohlberg Kravis Roberts.51 In April, the Seven Network
raised its stake in West Australian newspapers from 14.9% to just over 15%.
While previous media laws would not have allowed the Seven Network to
increase its stake, under current media laws the network has capitalised on its
ability to obtain a position of ‘control’.52
Takeover activity was also pre-emptively undertaken by News Corporation
and the Seven Network, acquiring a 7.5% and 5% stake respectively in Fairfax
before the promulgation of the new law.53 The $9 billion54 merger of Fairfax
Media Ltd and Rural Press Ltd was announced soon after the enactment of the
new media laws.55 The merger was finalised on 24 May 2007, and signalled
a significant opportunity for Fairfax to increase its market share in regional
Australia, as well as to capitalise on Rural Press’ already established online
presence.
In a statement released in anticipation of the merger, Ronald Walker, the
Chairman of Fairfax Media Ltd, said ‘this is a decisive step forward in our bid
to create Australasia’s largest integrated metropolitan, regional and rural print,
online and digital media business’.56 This statement draws attention to the
significance of the transaction in facilitating growth and a move into new
markets, which were among the primary aims of the legislation. In line with
discussion throughout this article, it is clear that this growth may have
strategic advantages as corporations are able to maximise economic
efficiencies, while also moving into new markets and opening up possibilities
for the consumer. At the same time, it is necessary to question whether the
expansion of an already dominant media entity is impacting upon the state of
media diversity in Australia.
In one of the most notable deals following the enactment of Australia’s
media ownership laws, Publishing and Broadcasting Ltd (PBL)57 sold 50% of
50 L Murray, ‘Seven has $3.2b to play with’, Sydney Morning Herald, 21 November 2006, at
<http://www.smh.com.au/news/business/seven-has-32b-to-play-with/2006/11/20/1163871
339404.html>.
51 Ibid, paras 1 and 9.
52 N Tabakoff, ‘Austar in play as new laws bite’, The Australian, 5 April 2007, at
<http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,21507173-7582,00.html>, para 4.
53 Ibid, para 2.
54 J Hogan, ‘Media shares surge’, The Age, 4 May 2007, at
<http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2007/05/03/1177788311072.html>.
55 Rural Press Ltd, ‘Schemes effective and Nominees to Fairfax media board’, Press Release,
2007, at <http://www.fxj.com.au/announcements/apr07/Nominees ToFairfaxBoard.pdf>.
56 Fairfax Media, ‘Fairfax media welcomes rural press shareholder vote to approve proposed
merger’, Press Release, 2007, at <http://www.fxj.com.au/announcements/
apr07/FXJ190407.pdf>, p 2.
57 PBL, ‘PBL media incorporates Ninemsn, ACP magazines, and the Nine network among
other entities’, 2007, at <http://www.pbl. com.au/nine_network.htm>.
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its media assets to CVC in October last year, in a $4.5 billion deal. The joint
venture was announced only months after new media laws passed through the
senate.
The media market continues to undergo great transformation. On 1 June
2007, PBL released a statement outlining the sale of a further 25% interest in
PBL media to CVC. This deal dramatically transforms the state of the
Australian market, as ‘the latest transaction will take CVC’s overall ownership
of PBL Media to 75% with PBL retaining a 25% share’.58 With the 25%
interest sold for $515 million, the changes that this deal imposes on the
Australian media market are significant. Australian media giant PBL has
relinquished control of its most significant media interests in less than one
year.
In 2006, the media market was in a state of flux with Australia’s largest
media corporations and players repositioning themselves within the media
market. Given the corporate nature of the deals, which are shielded by privacy,
it is difficult to comment on the effectiveness of the media laws in accounting
for all stakeholders.
While analysis of the media market shows clear evidence of takeover and
merger activity, the impact and effect of the takeovers that have been outlined
are not yet visible. While changes have occurred in the market, and continue
to occur, it is not yet possible to draw conclusions on whether these changes
positively or negatively affect the media market. Consequently, policy
considerations that were adopted in framing the legislation cannot yet be
critiqued. Continual monitoring of the market will be essential in ensuring that
corporations do not overstep legislative barriers.
As speculation of media mergers continue to surface and eventuate, it will
be continually important to monitor the changing state of the media landscape.
The introduction of the ACMA’s register of controlled media groups in March
2007 was just one significant step in regulating media ownership.59 As the
legislation has opened up the market to a state of deregulation, without
continued checks and balances, it may be difficult to monitor the effects of
mergers on the overall state of media ownership. The ACMA’S role in
monitoring the market is therefore important in ensuring that media
conglomerates do not materialise.
The introduction of Australia’s Digital Action plan60 in its entirety will also
facilitate a better understanding of legislative impacts. Currently, with some
parts of the plan in practice and other fundamental parts still pending
introduction, it is difficult to hypothesise on the impact of technological
influences in the context of media reform. When digital broadcasting services
function at their ultimate capabilities, this may increase the number of voices
in the media by providing increased and new platforms for broadcasting.
The stated aims of the Broadcasting Media Ownership Act resonate closely
with what this article argues is best practice. The Act aims to implement a
58 PBL, ‘PBL sells a 25% interest in PBL Media to CVC and Ticketek to PBL media’, Press
Release, 2007, at <http://pbl.com.au/Images/Document/PBL%20SELLS%20A%2025
%20PERCENT%20INTEREST%20IN%20PBL%20MEDIA%20TO%20CVC.pdf>, p 3.
59 ACMA, ‘Register of Controlled Media Groups’, 2007.
60 Commonwealth of Australia, above n 21.
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pre-emptive framework to move towards digital broadcasting, and also
considers changing patterns of accessing news and information. In addition,
the legislation aims to protect the social and political value of media diversity
by setting limits on the lowest levels of acceptable cross-media ownership.
Economic aims are also incorporated, as the Act supports a framework where
corporations can continue to meet existing efficiencies and, in many cases,
even take new opportunities for expansion.
While praised for facilitating digital convergence, and ensuring that the
legislation has practicality in the future, the legislature’s focus on facilitating
a move forward towards digital convergence could be deemed premature. The
statistics regarding patterns of howAustralians access media cast doubt on the
actual number of people who are making use of new modes of access. While
the number of people accessing news through the internet is growing, at
present new media formats are only being used by a small percentage of the
overall population. Therefore, it is arguable that the objectives underlying the
Media Ownership Act should be less focused on technological influences and
present a more balanced structure to protect the public’s interest in media
diversity.
While the introduction of a 5/4 rule is seen as establishing a balance
between protection of media diversity and deregulation, to account for
economic and technological development, it is unclear whether this rule goes
too far at the expense of media diversity. In the majority of Australian licence
areas, the 5/4 rule mimics the current state of the market and, accordingly, will
not result in a significant loss of media diversity. However, as established
earlier, in Melbourne and Sydney, which account for 36.88% of the Australian
population, the legislation will allow the number of media owners to be
reduced from eleven to five. Although it has been argued that five ‘voices’ are
sufficient to maintain media diversity by making further concentration of
media interests possible, the legislation is arguably taking a backwards step in
protecting media diversity.
The introduction of digital television has also played a significant part in
legislative change. The introduction of two new digital channels was believed
to be an important part of the framework, as it facilitates additional media
diversity by opening up the market to new players.61 In theory, opening up a
digital platform will increase the state of media diversity, however it is unclear
whether the Australian market is ready to take advantage of this new
technology. The government has already extended the target for the digital
switchover62 to 2012. Consequently, the digital platform will be unable to
fulfil its stated objective of maintaining the level of media diversity until
introduction.
Regulators in Australia face difficulties in enacting uniform regulation
across regional and city areas. While such difficulties are also evident in other
jurisdictions, these challenges are exacerbated inAustralia due to vast distance
and the recognition that social inequality and a reduction in living standards
results where services are not accessible. One of the strengths in theAustralian
61 Ibid.
62 The digital switchover refers to the timeline by which all analogue television broadcasting
services will be switched off. Following this, broadcasting will only be transmitted digitally.
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media regulation structure is the way in which limits on local content and
news delivery are stipulated for regional areas.63 It is important to recognise
that regulating media access in rural areas has specific challenges. Without
legislative guidelines stipulating standards for the maintenance of local news
services, conglomerate media owners would have the power to choose how to
limit services. It is likely that this power would be exercised based solely on
economic and financial considerations, rather than public interest.
In summation, Australian regulation attempts to balance all three competing
platforms. There is a particular focus on technological development that may
prove premature. By maintaining minimum control levels of ownership across
mediums, the legislation does appear to be protecting media diversity by
ensuring that it does not fall below a minimum standard. The legislation may
prove difficult to enforce if corporations are slow to register and disclose their
interests, although the extended powers of the ACMA should assist in
ensuring compliance with legislative standards.
The answer to the question of whether the focus on technological
convergence will meet its stated objectives remains unsolved three years after
the 2006 enactment. As long as digital technology is taken on board, the
legislation is likely to be considered successful in balancing all interests. If the
digital convergence does not progress as expected, the reduction in media
diversity may be considered unjustified. Failure of digital uptake will
undermine the aims of the legislation and could give rise to speculation that
the legislative policy was biased towards economic and corporate interests at
the expense of social/political interests.
Media ownership regulation in Italy
Italian trends in accessing news and information point to television as the
primary source. The Organisation for Security and Co-Operation in Europe
(OSCE) states:
Television has developed over time to become the main source of information for the
Italian public, with fourteen nationwide surface-frequency channels and more than
five hundred local and regional channels. There are thousands of radio stations in the
country. Newspaper readership on the other hand, at 6 million daily, has remained
roughly the same for the past fifty years.64
As most Italians turn to television as their primary source of news and
information, this increases the possibility of concentrated media ownership
having an unfavourable impact upon media pluralism and diversity. While
Italy has 14 channels, the distribution of market share and ownership between
these channels has resulted in the existence of a duopoly.65
OSCE reports reinforce this obligation, drawing attention to the highly
concentrated nature of media ownership in Italy:
63 Media Ownership Act: s 43A (material of local significance — regional aggregated
commercial television broadcasting licences); s 43B (local presence — regional commercial
radio broadcasting licences); and s 43C (local content — regional commercial radio
broadcasting licences).
64 OSCE, ‘Visit to Italy: The Gasparri Law, observations and recommendations’, OSCE
Report, 7 June 2005, at <http://www.osce.org/documents/rfm/2005/06/15459_en.pdf>, p 6.
65 Ibid, p 11.
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Within the market of these fourteen channels, the public-service broadcaster RAI
and the privately owned Mediaset muster a duopoly in audience share with around
45 percent each (both own three channels). This 90% share is split amongst the three
channels, but in actual fact only between these two companies. The remaining 10
percent of the audience share is distributed between the remaining eight national TV
outlets.66
The current media duopoly consists of the Italian public service broadcaster
RAI, which comprises three television networks, three radio networks, one
digital network and other specialised networks. The other major player is
Silvio Berlusconi, who exerts significant influence over the commercial
broadcasting sector; owning Canale 5, Italia 1 and Rete Quattro, one
newspaper, a book and magazine publishing house (Mondadori), and
advertising agency (Publitalia). During his reign as Italian prime minister,
Berlusconi was further able to exert influence over the Italian public
broadcaster RAI. Referring to Berlusconi’s influence over the Italian media,
the European Federation of Journalists said: ‘In no other settled democracy in
the world has such a situation ever existed.’67
Analysis of advertising has provided further evidence of Italy’s media
duopoly. Statistics quoted by the OSCE reveal that in 2004:
• Mediaset received 58.3% of advertising revenues;
• RAI received 28.1% of advertising revenues;
• eight other nationwide commercial channels received 2% or less of
advertising revenues each; and
• local/regional television stations received 9% of advertising revenues
all inclusive.68
Due to the existence of a duopoly market and legislation that is often
charged with political motives, Feintuck has argued that that regulation is
‘merely symbolic’ and largely insignificant in the Italian media market.69
The OSCE has summarised many of the issues which affect media
ownership policy, stating:
Italy has an ongoing record of control over and interference with public-service
television by political parties and governments. As the Prime Minister is also the
country’s main media entrepreneur, the ‘traditional’ fears of governmental control of
RAI are aggravated by worries of a general governmental control of the nation’s
most important information source, television.70
Recent history
Media regulation in Italy was founded in Article 21 of the Constitution (1947)
introduced to ensure political independence of the state broadcaster, RAI.
66 Ibid.
67 European Federation of Journalists, ‘Crisis in Italian Media: how poor politics and flawed
legislation put journalism under pressure’, Report of the IFJ/ EFJ Mission to Italy, 6–8
November 2003, at <http://www.ifj-europe.org/pdfs/Italy%20Mission%20Final.pdf>, p 4.
68 OSCE, above n 64, p 11.
69 M Feintuck, Media Regulation, Public Interest and the Law, Edinburgh University Press,
Edinburgh, 1999, p 174.
70 OSCE, above n 64, p 18.
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The socio-political rationale behind the introduction of cross-media
ownership regulation in Italy has not withstood the dramatic changes in
legislative framework that governs the Italian media scope. As early as
20 years after the introduction of television broadcasting in Italy (1954), the
government exercised a controlled cartel over broadcasting.71
The 1975 Broadcasting Act (No 103) split the public broadcaster RAI into
two (and later three) networks. This Act introduced the system of a
lottizzazione, which divided RAI into separate networks that represented
diverse political parties.
Prior to the introduction of the Broadcasting Act, Silvio Berlusconi’s
Finivest began to take control of the television market.72 While the 1975
legislation effecting the lottizzazione attempted to remove power from
national broadcaster RAI, it resulted in the conglomeration of smaller media
companies which formed syndicated groups. Berlusconi used this structural
shortcoming to expand his media interests and effectively take control of the
market.73
A decision of the Constitutional Court in 1976 (Judgement 202),74 found
that the monopoly control of public television broadcasting in Italy was
unconstitutional. Following this ruling, there was a proliferation of
independent local stations, which ultimately gave way to mergers between
independent stations and Finivest (Berlusconi’s holding company).
Consequently, RAI and Finivest dominated the Italian market to such an
extent that they were deemed to hold a monopoly.75 The decision of the
constitutional court was seen as revolutionary in breaking up this concentrated
ownership structure, signalling ‘a new historical phase in Italian
broadcasting’.76
The revolution was short-lived, as evident in 1984 when Italian Prime
Minister Craxi issued a decree allowing Berlusconi’s television interests to
continue broadcasting despite an administrative decision to prevent it
broadcasting due to policy breaches.77 This decree was later indoctrinated into
legislation, and became known as Craxi’s decree.78 It was clear that this
71 H Kesson, ‘Seeing the back of Berlusconi? The Current situation of the Media in Italy’,
FlowTV article, 28 July 2006, at <http://flowtv.org/?p=182>, para 4.
72 M Hibberd, ‘Silvio Berlusconi and the Media in Italy: Conflicts of Interest’, Paper presented
at the RIPE Public Service Broadcasting Conference, 2006, at
<http://www.yle.fi/ripe/Papers/Hibberd.pdf>, p 15.
73 Ibid, p 14.
74 Corte Costituzionale della Repubblica italiana, ‘Giudizio di Legittimita Costituzionale in Via
Incidentale’, Summaries of Judgments and Orders since 1956, 1976, at
<http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/eng/attivitacorte/pronunceemassime/massime/schedaMS.
asp?Comando=LET&NoMS=8513&TrmT=&TrmL=>.
75 By the end of the 1980s, Berlusconi had come to dominate ‘the private sector of television
broadcasting. The three largest private networks were his (Canale 5, Retequattro and Italia
1), and his closest competitor (Telemontecarlo) lagged far behind. The RAI and Finivest
networks all but monopolized the Italian television audience’: R Gunther and A Mughan,
Democracy and the Media — A Comparative Perspective, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 2000, p 206.
76 Ortoleva in Hibberd, above n 72, p 8.
77 Hibberd, above n 72, p 15.
78 Ibid.
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decree undermined the power of the constitutional court in restricting
conglomerate media ownership.79
By 1990, Mammi Law (No 223, 6 August 1990) carried on the de-regulated
approach to cross-media ownership, ruling that no corporate owner or group
could own more than 3/12 licensed networks. ThisAct was introduced to place
limitations on what was known as the ‘“wild west” of all broadcasting
systems’.80 Rather than regulating with the aim of establishing ideal media
ownership structures, the law sanctioned the existence of a duopoly in Italian
media holdings.
Current status
Media ownership in Italy is currently governed by The Gasparri Law81 and the
Frattini Law,82 which were introduced in response to continued calls for
legislation to reduce the concentration of television and media ownership in
Italy.
During Berlusconi’s reign as Italian Prime Minister between 2001–2006,
both the Gasparri and Frattini laws came to fruition. These laws were
implemented in a bid to address major shortcomings in the regulation of
cross-media ownership laws.
As discussed above, these shortcomings include:
• the continued existence of a duopoly over national television
broadcasting (despite legislative attempts to open up the market to
competitors and diversity of ownership);
• a conflict of interest situation, whereby the owner of a large
proportion of private broadcasting services was also in control of the
public broadcasting sector, by virtue of being the prime minister;83
and
• the lack of any legislation which set limitations upon cross-media
ownership, and which could be enforced to ensure that the public’s
interest in media diversity was recognised.
At the time of its introduction, the Gasparri Law was believed to be an
‘avant-garde law’84 as it was focused on opening up the market to encourage
the shift from analog to digital and, in the process, facilitated the convergence
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid, p 13.
81 The ‘Gasparri law’ refers to Law 3 May 2004, No 112: OSCE, above n 64, p 2.
82 The ‘Frattini Law’ refers to Law 20 July 2004, No 215: ‘Norme in materia di risoluzione dei
conflitti di interesse’, which can be translated as ‘rules of solving conflicts of interest’:
OSCE, above n 64, p 2.
83 After previously serving in a Prime Ministerial position, Berlusconi was re-elected as Prime
Minister of Italy in 2001. Berlusconi’s re-election raised a number of questions regarding his
conflict of interest in amending media laws to more favourably serve his personal corporate
interests, as well as questions regarding pluralism of the media, whereby Berlusconi’s
control over private, as well as public sector broadcasting was deemed controversial.
84 OSCE, above n 64, p 29.
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of communications systems by introducing the concept of Sistema Integrato
della Communicazioni (SIC), translated as Integrated System of
Communications.85
The SIC concept has been criticised in an International Federation of
Journalists (IFJ) Report, which is critical of the way that the Gasparri Law:
creates a massive new economic sector which brings together all information,
communication and media enterprises and then puts a limit of 20 per cent on any
individual holding, and which dramatically weakens existing rules, which limit
media ownership.86
One of the main objectives of the Gasparri Law was the facilitation of the
move towards ‘Digital terrestrial television service’. The Gasparri Law came
into effect in 2004, following approval by the chamber and senate. Article 1
of the legislation outlines the objectives of the law, and a translation reads:
This law identifies the main principles which form the structure of the national,
regional and local radio and television system, and upgrades it to the advent of
digital technology and the convergence process between radio and television and
other personal and mass communication fields such as telecommunications, the
press, even electronic and internet in all its applications.87
Included in the application framework of this law, it continues, are
broadcasts of television programmes, radio programmes and data programmes even
with conditioned access, as well as the supply of associated interactive services and
conditioned access services on terrestrial frequencies, via cable and via satellite.88
Consequently, by broadcasters operating on a digital network, restrictions are
removed as the market is opened up to more players, inevitably encouraging
media pluralism. As an OSCE report recognised, ‘[m]any aspects of the
Gasparri Law are unquestionably leading towards the multiplication of
broadcasting channels. They create opportunities for diversification and
synergies between the channels’.89
Despite the influence of technological factors on the formation of Italian
media laws, the Gasparri Law falls notably short of its objectives, by failing
to initiate change in the broadcasting sector. The Gasparri Law has also failed
to balance competing political influences on law by reducing the concentration
of media ownership. The OSCE recognises this paradox; ‘the transition from
monopolistic to pluralist television should precede the transition to the
Gasparri convergence market’.90 This view recognises the need to balance
competing policy interests so that legislative amendments reflect a range of
priorities, rather than one field.
Further, the Frattini Law places a limit upon the extent to which
85 The legislation defines SIC as including ‘daily newspapers and periodicals, electronic and
directory publishing, including the internet; radio and television; cinema, external
advertising, product and service announcements; sponsorship’.
86 International Freedom of Expression Exchange, ‘IFJ welcomes president’s decision to block
communications law’, Press Release, 2003, p 1.
87 RAI Social Action Department, ‘Digital terrestrial television’, 2003, at
<http://www.segretariatosociale.rai.it/INGLESE/atelier/dtt/digitale_terrestre.html>, para 6.
88 Ibid.
89 OSCE, above n 64, p 32.
90 Ibid, p 41.
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government officials can manage interests that amount to a conflict of interest
with their office. The enforceability of the Frattini Law is contained in s 7,
which gives the Broadcasting Authority power to take action against media
corporations that display preference towards a government official. Yet Prodi’s
reign was short lived, with Berlusconi again assuming office as the Prime
Minister of Italy in May 2006.
Future directions and evaluations
Following Berlusconi’s removal from the Office of Prime Minister, after the
2006 national election, there were predictions that: ‘The Italian media
landscape will go through significant shifts . . . The Prodi cabinet, sworn in
May [2006], has already proposed media legislation in order to put some
limits to media ownership.’91
Media ownership laws in Italy are subject to discussions on the adoption of
uniform European standards. The introduction of a uniform European standard
necessitates indepth analysis on many levels, and while this is not within the
scope of this article, it is important to note Italy’s position as a European
Union (EU) member in any discussion regarding the regulatory framework of
its media ownership laws. Italy’s positioning within the European Union may
provide additional incentive for the country to conform to established
standards. The European Federation of Journalists (EFJ) stated that: ‘The
Italian crisis is unlikely to be solved only at an Italian national level.’92
In 2002, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Freimut
Duve, brought Italy’s failure to guarantee media pluralism to the forefront of
the Convention on the Future of the European Union.93 While there was no
action taken against Italy to enforce its constitutional obligations as an EU
member, it is clear that Italy’s position within the EU provides an additional
safeguard for media pluralism than in nations which do not have any
international or common standards imposed on the law of the nation state.
The future directions and outcomes of reform signalled by the Italian
government are unclear. The EFJ believes that:
The situation has not yet deteriorated to a level that sees press freedom and the core
democratic right of free expression compromised. Indeed, Italy has a vibrant and
plural printed press, a robust and diverse radio landscape, and the country’s
journalists are able to assert their rights to freedom of speech.94
If the EFJ is correct, and the Italian media upholds values of pluralism and
press freedom, then the government still faces a challenge. These values
should be reflected in law, so that neither the government nor corporate
interests can unduly affect regulation of the media industry.
Historical patterns of media ownership regulation in Italy draw attention to
an array of policy considerations that will affect future directions. Most
notably, there have been:
91 European Journalism Centre, ‘Media Landscape — Italy’ 2007, at <http://www.
ejc.net/media_landscape/article/italy/>, para 3.
92 EFJ, above n 67, p 86.
93 OSCE, ‘Italy’s Media Ownership — A Challenge to the European Constitutional
Architecture’, Press Release, 2002, at <http://www.osce.org/item/6599.html>, para 3.
94 EFJ, above n 67, p 82.
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• concerns that political figures and political policies have unduly
impacted upon legislative directions to suit their own interests; and
• a highly concentrated ownership of the media sector, in the form of
a duopoly of television broadcasting, whereby television is the
primary source through which news and information is accessed.
In analysing the extent to which competing policy interests have resonated in
law, Italy has been selected for comparison with Australia as there is evidence
that media ownership regulation is not only influenced by the abovementioned
technological and economic trends but, rather, is heavily influenced by
‘domestic Italian politics’.95
The rationale behind the introduction of the Gasparri Law was that it would
facilitate the opening up of the market for digital technology, while also
promoting pluralism by increasing the number of network channels. This
argument resonates closely with that put forward in Australia. Although one
inherent difficulty in the Italian model is that by merging all forms of
communication together, the task of regulating control of media interests
becomes increasingly difficult.
Recent ownership structures of the Italian media have illustrated the
outcome of blurred boundaries. During Berlusconi’s reign, in which the
government controlled public interests while also holding corporate interests,
the motivations behind media ownership policy were continually questioned.
It remained unclear whether decisions were being made to further social and
political interests of having a free press or, alternatively, whether decisions to
free up the market were made to advance Berlusconi’s economic interests in
gaining conglomerate control of media interests.
While the Gasparri Law was introduced on the premise of facilitating
technological change, in effect the legislation has done little to place
restrictions on media ownership, and this could be linked back to political
motives as opposed to technological development.
Having examined the recent history and current state of media ownership
laws in Italy, it is strikingly clear that political motives have had a much
greater impact on the direction of the law than public policy concerns.
Berlusconi purportedly attempted to address public policy considerations and
yield to the public’s interest in pluralism of the press. The introduction of the
mild Frattini Law, and its lack of effectiveness in breaking up the Italian media
cartel dominated by RAI and Finivest, is proof that the government introduced
legislation that was heavily influenced by political preferences, at the expense
of its stated objective of promoting pluralism and democracy.
The SIC structure was fashioned to remove definitional barriers between
communication formats, so that technological innovation and digital
convergence could be promoted. However, the concept of a merged
communication network has created difficulties in regulating ownership of
relevant market sectors. This can be contrasted to the model of ‘content’
regulation that is often promoted within the Australian context. While
apparently created to advance technological interests, the SIC structure has
effectively allowed the market to become more concentrated. This
inconsistency in policy objectives and practical effect raises questions as to
95 Hibberd, above n 72, p 51.
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whether economic interests played a greater role in instigating the structure of
the legislation.
Competition law has done little to prevent ownership structures reflecting
the interests of major media corporations. As Hibberd stated, ‘[t]he Gasparri
and Frattini laws have allowed Berlusconi and Mediaset to maintain a
dominant hold in the broadcasting sector without reaching the antitrust limit.
Pressures to retain the status quo remain strong’.96
In Italy, there has been a notable absence of adequate legislation in the area
of cross-media ownership. When the legislature has attempted to regulate the
media market, such attempts have been largely influenced by the political and
economic interests of corporations. Consequently, it is clear that rather than
implementing progressive legal policy, Italian legislation has regulated solely
to maintain the status quo. In order for the Italian legislature to develop new
progressive policies, it will be necessary for the legislature to break the chain
of political influence. With a new government in power, the Italian media
landscape is now in a position to benefit from the introduction of new policy
dimensions.
A comparative analysis of cross-media ownership
policies in Australia and Italy
There are several bases on which a comparative study between Australian and
Italian cross-media ownership policy and legislation can be carried out.
Through analysis of theoretical foundations, and exploration of legislative
history and directions in Australia and Italy, this article has established
recurring themes which will now be used as a starting point to compare media
ownership in Australia and Italy. Relevant grounds for comparative analysis
include: legal patterns and history; approaches to deregulation; definitions of
‘control’ in the media market; and competition law.
Legal patterns and history
The directions of the law in the past, and the extent of political interference in
public policy, may shed light on the possibility of patterns continuing or,
conversely, changing to reflect a new position:
Australian media policy is marked by pragmatism, which is both its strength and
weakness. Laws and policies are formed in response to actual plans and prospects
of the major players. Policies can and do change quickly, and they are usually
discussed and negotiated in advance with the major players.97
The argument is that the Australian legislature is reactive in regulating
cross-media ownership. Media moguls such as Rupert Murdoch and the late
Kerry Packer are widely believed to have exercised political influence over the
directions of media regulation. Australian media policy cannot be defined as
solely reactive, as proven by the enactment of the Media Ownership Act,
which is one example of media policy being implemented subject to the
resistance of major media players.
96 Venice Commission: ibid, p 54.
97 International Institute of Communications, above n 2.
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A comparison with Italy highlights a dire situation where political interests
have overtly overlapped with legislative policy directions. The process of
media legislation in Italy has been referred to as ‘photocopy laws’, in
reference to the fact that the laws have reinforced already existing ownership
structures, as opposed to being visionary and overhauling the system to move
towards the objective of media pluralism.98 The EFJ stated that:
The country’s political culture has contributed to a widespread passivity over media
matters. Over the past 25 years a powerful commercial television sector has been
established, eventually concentrated in the hands of the Berlusconi ‘trust’.99
Thus, the Italian legislature has not held a leading role in shaping the
directions of the Italian media landscape.
In summary, the Italian jurisdiction shows overt examples of legislation
being implemented to reinforce and legalise existing ownership structures.
While there is evidence to support this stance in Australia, it appears that the
Australian legislature has been more effective at intertwining competing
interests to introduce proactive policies.
Approaches and rationales underlying deregulation
As previously established, Australian regulations are highly influenced by
technological dimensions. By looking forward and implementing legislation
that will foster a move towards new communication access structures, the
Australian legislature is using the law to direct the structure of the media
industry. This pre-emptive approach can be contrasted to the situation in Italy,
where ‘photocopy’100 laws have been introduced after the fact to mirror the
existing status of media ownership. By simply legislating to authorise existing
structures, the Italian legislature is prevented from developing
forward-thinking regulations that will adequately balance all competing
interests.
In Italy, deregulation has been the result of disorganised and haphazard
legal policy. The link between policy and legislative outcome has been
summarised by the EFJ, which states:
although the Gasparri Law was born with the intention to create a new, more suitable
framework for the regulation of a fast-changing media landscape, it immediately
raised fears that it was intended to give more possibilities for Mediaset to expand.101
Analysis of legal history shows that attempts to regulate the media have often
been limited to the legalisation of already existing market structures.
Consequently, rather than being the result of a planned policy initiative,
deregulation in the Italian market has occurred haphazardly, and has not
justified its position amidst the scope of political, economic and technological
issues.
Doyle and Hibberd argue that ‘advanced capitalist societies now have more
market-driven media industries as a result of a response to economic and
98 OSCE, above n 64, p 22.
99 EFJ, above n 67, p 76.
100 OSCE, above n 64, p 22.
101 EFJ, above n 67, p 25.
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technological changes’.102 Recognising this general trend, the ownership
situation in Australia and Italy is not seen as exclusive, but rather the
culmination of a broader international move towards the deregulation of the
media. Matthew Hibberd places the study of media ownership regulation in
Italy in context, stating:
Italy is not unique in experiencing the following trends: move away from
mono-media ownership to cross-media ownership, the development of ‘old’ and
‘new’ media industries under the control of single multinational corporations.103
Following the inception of the Media Ownership Act, the Australian media
landscape is undergoing a process of deregulation. It is clear that media
entities are restructuring to take advantage of opportunities to expand and
realign their economic interests. Also undergoing change, the Italian media
market is at a different stage, and can shed light on Australian directions. In
Italy, the deregulation of cross-media ownership barriers, and the introduction
of the SIC structure, has facilitated the growth and dominance of large media
corporations. In Australia, it is unclear whether deregulation will ultimately
lead to further conglomeration of the media market. By maintaining divisions
between ‘traditional’ and ‘new’ forms of media, it is possible that Australia
may avoid the fate of the Italian media landscape, which has blurred the
barriers and boundaries by creating an ‘integrated communications system’.
Italian and Australian policy directions both recognise technological
development and the digital revolution as the primary instigators of legislative
change. While it is argued that, in practice, technological and economic
interests indirectly advance social political interests, the practical outcomes in
Italy suggest otherwise.
Departing from the same emphasis on technological development, the
situation in Italy can be used as a warning for Australian policy directions. The
Italian legislature believed that by expanding the definition of the SIC,
corporations would be benefited by being able to align their economic
interests with opportunities in the technological sector. In practice, the strategy
appears to have been furthered by economic rather than technological
interests, as rather than simply repositioning their interests in light of
technological development, large corporate entities have extended their reach
over the market. To a certain extent, Australian policy directions appear to
have been fashioned more cautiously as there are specific provisions based
solely on social and political interests.
The role of competition law
The role of competition law has been maintained in both the Australian and
Italian media markets. Around the globe, competition law is believed to hold
an important role in regulating the media industry.104 Many nations believe
that competition laws are sufficient to form the basis of cross-media ownership
102 Hibberd, above n 72, p 50.
103 Ibid.
104 See Table 1; K Deirde, ‘Media Ownership and pluralism: regulatory trends and challenges
in the European Union Member States’ (2004) European Public Real Estate Association
(EPRA), at <http://www.epra.org/content/english/press/papers/Media%20ownership%20and
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regulation, and therefore do not introduce specific cross media ownership
laws. Those nations that have competition law as well as regulation specific to
the media industry recognise that:
Although competition law is an important part of regulation, it is not designed to
deliver greater diversity and plurality in the media. Competition rules can address
issues of concentration, efficiency and choice, and will tend to encourage dispersed
ownership and new entry . . . however, they cannot guarantee any of it.105
In Australia, the Trade Practices Act has retained its status following the
enactment of the Media Ownership Act. The ACCC will continue to assess
whether media mergers satisfy competition requirements. The chairman of the
ACCC, Graeme Samuel, has reinforced the important role of competition law
in facilitating an open media market. He said:
Regardless of any changes made to media ownership laws, s 50 of the Trade
Practices Act — which prevents mergers or changes in ownership between two or
more entities which result in a substantial lessening of competition — should
continue to prevent undue concentration or accumulation of market power in the
media, which would result in higher prices or lower quality service for consumers.106
Competition law has also retained its position under Italian law, despite the
regulatory structure undergoing a number of changes. In Italy, competition
law represents a fundamental framework in the area of media regulation, as
despite the political influence that has directed media specific legislation,
competition law has remained relatively stable.
Thus, a comparison of regulatory structures in Italy and Australia reveals
that both nations place relevance on the important role of competition laws in
regulating the media market. Although there are disparities in the way that
media specific regulations are influenced by social political, economic and
technological dimensions, both nations recognise that competition laws are
insufficient to account for all competing interests.
Defining control and the barriers of the ‘media market’
In Italy, legislative structures have moved towards an integrated
communications system which broadly defines the scope of legislation. This
definition broadens the applicability of cross-media ownership quotas and,
accordingly, has allowed for greater concentration of media ownership. In
Australia, while the legislature is moving towards recognition of new media,
there are still boundaries between different mediums.
In Italy, the SIC structure was introduced based on the rationale that it
would facilitate technological development and digital convergence.
Consequently, the structure has allowed an already concentrated media market
%20pluralism%20Kevin%20Istanbul%20final.ppt>; and Office of Communications
(OFCOM), ‘Review of Media Ownership Rules’, 2006, at
<http://www.ofcom.org.uk/research/media_owners/rulesreview/rules.pdf>, p 49.
105 Department of Culture, Media and Sport, Consultation on media ownership rules,
26 November 2001, para 1.10.
106 G Samuel, Speech delivered at the Australian Communications & Media Authority 1st
Annual Conference, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 2005, at
<http://www.accc.gov.au/content/item.phtml?itemId=713959&nodeId=46345e11cff0892258
d2bacf451cbca3&fn=20051110%20ACMA.pdf>.
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to become further concentrated without breaching established limits.
Amendments to the Australian media scope under the Media Ownership Act
have also incorporated a focus on opening the market to allow technological
opportunities to be taken up.
Similar to Australian legislation, the Gasparri Law sets out certain
stipulated caps on cross-media ownership holdings. In Italy, these are in the
form of market ceilings, although these laws have been deemed incapable of
reducing the media concentration in the Italian media market.107 The
shortcomings of this broad, integrated approach to market regulation can be
compared to the continued existence of segregation in the Australian
legislative model.
The continued division of broadcasting sectors can be seen as an important
step in ensuring that media diversity can be kept in check, as there are
constructive barriers that facilitate checks and balances in the aim towards
pluralism.
While the Italian situation has moved towards recognition of an integrated
communications network, the Australian situation has not yet gone this far as
there are still caps on certain types of cross-media ownership, as well as in the
form of the 5/4 rule, notably distinct from the broad 20% rule which exists
under the Gasparri Law.
While the Gasparri Law effectively introduced a form of limitation on
cross-media ownership, the form of regulation created under the Act
facilitated a different outcome to that under Australian law. Due to limitations
imposed by the Australian Constitution and statutory definitions, the
application of the Media Ownership Act extends to cover radio, television,
print and data-casting services. Conversely, the Gasparri Law has opened up
the realm of cross-media entities to include not only dominant forms of media,
but also ‘film and music production, book publishing, text publishing, on-line
services, advertising and marketing, and the public service sector’.108
By covering such a broad range of media, it is argued that it is difficult to
define dominant market players. Amendments to the Media Ownership Act in
Australia have attempted to curtail perceived difficulties in determining
dominant market players by imposing a system for media owners to register
their interests with the ACMA.109
Other comparative considerations
One key point of difference between these two jurisdictions is the structure of
constitutional frameworks. As Australia does not have a formal bill of rights
which protects freedom to communicate and media diversity, it is essentially
up to the legislature to address these interests. On the other hand, media
regulation in Italy is further informed by the jurisprudential and regulatory
framework of the European Union.
107 OSCE, above n 64, p 51.
108 EFJ, above n 67, p 27.
109 Section 61AU of the Broadcasting Services (Media Ownership) Act 2006 sets out the
requirement for the ACMA to maintain a Register of Controlled Media Groups.
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Conclusion
In all societies the questions of who owns and controls the media, and for what
purposes, have been political issues.110
Decisions made throughout the legislative process are not always made on a
factual basis or according to empirical research. Rather, decisions and
outcomes can be the result of ad-hoc processes and influences that are not
clearly stipulated. The interaction of the diverse theoretical fields explored
above ultimately rests on political decisions. Doyle refers to those with media
ownership interests as having:
the political power to re-design media ownership policies to their own ends, they
have also been uniquely well placed to sustain a climate of public indifference to any
negative consequences arising from these changes. It seems that a continuation of
alignments between corporate media and political interests suits all those who are
empowered to instigate changes.111
Academics and theorists from different schools of thought and policy analysts
alike acknowledge the desirability of reforming media ownership. While
change is desired, the structure of change remains under scrutiny. With the
introduction of the Media Ownership Act, changes in the structure of the
media market will draw attention to any alleged shortcomings of the law.
Individuals, corporations and societies with interests in media regulation
have framed their views within certain limitations and scopes. Defining the
media landscape as a field that is heavily influenced by technological
developments incorporating the ‘new media’ as well as ‘the digital age’, a
deregulated mode of legislative amendment has emerged as favourable. In an
era where change is rapid, it is important to objectively look at the state of the
field and consider changes to media ownership amid a wider field.
Recognising that regulation of the media is influenced by competing
dimensions, the complexity of the question of reform becomes increasingly
evident. At the same time, the importance of resolving this question fairly and
accurately emerges more clearly. It is clear that amendments to cross media
ownership regulations will facilitate even greater concentration of media
ownership112 and, accordingly, will reduce the scope of media diversity.
Therefore, despite new rationales that have been put forward in favour of
lessening restrictions on conglomerate ownership, it would be highly desirable
for the traditional foundations upon which media ownership laws have been
founded to continue to be recognised, and carried forward in the regulation of
media ownership interests.
While there are heady arguments for the complete deregulation of
cross-media ownership laws to allow competition law to regulate the market,
there are many points of contention surrounding this view. Barendt has argued
that ‘public monopolies may in practice provide the best guarantees of
110 E Herman and R McChesney, ‘The power of the media’ in Feintuck, above n 69, p 18.
111 Doyle, above n 20, p 177.
112 Refer to table of current media outlets and projected changes to ownership: Gardiner-Garden
and Chowns, above n 26, p 66.
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plurality in media output’.113 As media regulation is supported and
underpinned by a range of foundations, including the socio-political and the
need to uphold democracy, as opposed to solely economic theory, there are
ostensibly many shortcomings in using competition law as a basis for
regulating media ownership.
Defining cross-media ownership predominantly within the legal realm
poses significant limitations in itself. Any radical overhaul or amendment to
the law should occur following widespread public debate on the issue. The
multiplicity of divergent frameworks and interests in cross-media ownership
laws should be considered and carefully balanced.
Analysis of the development and apparent consequences of cross-media
ownership in other jurisdictions, including Italy, draws attention to the
widespread impact that amendments to this field of law can have. It is clear
that regulation of the media must be informed and defined by the interaction
of diverse fields of influence.
While the trend towards deregulation in Australia has followed the
increasingly international move towards the deregulation of media ownership
and foreign ownership restrictions internationally, it is questionable whether
this is the best means of balancing competing interests.
It is indisputable that the shift towards digital means of accessing media and
information, as well as the technological revolution, has created the need for
a regulatory framework which allows traditional forms of media to compete
and enter this new realm. At the same time, the way in which media reform
has occurred arguably does not go far enough in protecting the public interest
and notion of pluralism.
While public policy considerations are often cited as reasons for limiting
regulation (in order to encourage a freeing up of the market and the
opportunity for greater diversity), this is often not the case in practice. The
highly concentrated ownership of the Italian media scope is proof that relaxed
cross-media ownership regulation ultimately leads to greater concentration as
opposed to greater diversity.
A comparative study of Italy and Australia’s regulatory practices has shown
that while both nations have aspired to balance all three objectives, neither
country has succeeded in accomplishing best practice. Italy has ostensibly
suffered worse consequences than Australia. However, both nations have a
long way to go.
113 E Barendt, ‘Competition law and the public interest in media regulation’ in Feintuck, above
n 69, p 87.
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